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COMMENTAIRES 
JOB SEARCH AND WAGE BEHAVIOUR 
Claude RONDEAU 
Récent studies in job search theory emphasize the importance of 
unemployment duration and of the level of aspiration in the déter-
mination of the asking wage of job seekers. The job searcher is assumed 
to exhibit an adaptive aspiration level which results in a declining 
level of the asking wage as the duration of unemployment increases 
(Holt, 1970). ' 
On the other hand, Mackay (1972) has suggested an interesting 
hypothesis with respect to job search strategy which, if further support-
ed, would shed additional light on the behaviour of job searchers. 
According to this hypothesis, some job searchers, called «stickers», 
will accept relatively long periods of unemployment after lay-off in order 
to find a job comparable to the one previously held in terms of wage 
and stability of employment. Others, called «snatchers», are «multiple 
job changers » ; they exhibit less overall unemployment but an initially 
greater fall in wages; eventually, however, snatchers recoup thèse 
losses by moving the higher wage levels and better jobs. 
The purpose of this note it to examine asking wages and accepted 
wages of workers involved in a mass lay-off, in the light of thèse 
propositions. The data were collected in the Spring of 1971 through a 
questionnaire mailed to 3026 blue- and white-collar workers laid-off by 
a large aeronautical firm in the Montréal area over a fifteen-month 
period from January 1970 to March 1971. Out of a total of 1209 question-
naires returned, 212 were rejected mainly because of inconsistent 
replies with respect to dates of employment. Table 1 describes the 
sample used. Of the 997 cases studied, 593 were continuously unem-
ployed (Group A), 152 accepted one or more temporary jobs (Group B), 
* C. RONDEAU, Professeur agrégé, École des relations industrielles, Université 
de Montréal, Montréal. 
** Premilinary analysis of the data must be credited to my research assistant 
Bernard Elie. Gilles Guérin, Léo Roback and Claude D'Aoust read the first draft and 
their suggestions improved the clarity of the text. 
1
 Most authors, with the exception of Mortensen (1970), assume a declining 
asking wage through a period of unemployment; see Kasper (1967), McCall (1970), 
Gronau (1970). Holt is emphasized hère because his concept of the level of the asking 
wage is clearer. 
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72 accepted at least one temporary job but were permanently employed 
at the time of inquiry (Group C), and 180 never had a temporary 
job and were permanently employed at the time of inquiry (Group D). 
The meaning of Group A is self-evident. Group B is seen as rnade up 
of «snatchers» or «multiple job changers». Group C is also seen as 
a group of «snatchers», with the différence that a permanent job was 
found and accepted after a number of jobs had been held temporar-
ily. Group D is defined as a group of «stickers», i.e. those who wait-
ed in order to find a job which they considered permanent. Much 
of the analysis which follows rests upon thèse distinctions. They are 
based on a preliminary treatment of the data which showed that jobs 
labeled as temporary were of significantly shorter average duration 
than jobs labeled as permanent;2 moreover, two thirds of the workers 
holding permanent jobs said they had no intention of quitting volun-
tarily. Finally, the average number of temporary jobs held was 1.5 for 
group B and 1.8 for group C (not counting the permanent job in the 
latter case). Thus although the distinction is not as clear eut as one 
might désire, it appears strong enough for our purposes, and justifies 
the use of the concepts of «snatchers» and «stickers». 
TABLE 1 
Description of sample 
Group Group A Group B Group C Group D Total 
Identification Continuous Temporary Temporary Permanent 
unemployment employment and perma- employment 
(snatchers) nent em-
ployment 
(snatchers) 
(stickers) 
n 593 152 72 180 997 
% 59.5 15.2 7.2 18.1 100.0 
Average number 
of jobs 0 1.5 2.8 1.0 
— 
Average duration 168 294 313 261 228 
of lay-off (days) 
Average duration 
of unemployment (days) I 168 174 105 84 149 
We shall analyse the behaviour of thèse four groups with respect 
to minimum asking wages, accepted wages in temporary and/or per-
manent employment, and total unemployment duration. It should be 
noted that for multiple job changers (groups B and C), accepted wage 
rates hâve been averaged over ail jobs occupied.3 The level of aspi-
2
 Average duration of permanent jobs was 177.4 days for group D; average 
durations of temporary jobs varied between 4.8 days and 98.3 days for groups B and C. 
3
 Various wage rates accepted were found to be randomly distributed over 
jobs. 
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ration is defined as the minimum wage acceptable by the job searcher.4 
Unemployment duration is the number of days spent looking for work 
(excluding time in employment) after lay-off and up to the time of 
inquiry.5 
Two additional remarks are necessary before the results are 
presented and discussed. During the 15 month period covered hère, the 
unemployment rate averaged 8.3% in Québec, ranging from 8.0% in 
January 1970 to 6.3% in September 1970 and over 10% in the fîrst 
quarter of 1971. Secondly, the lay-offs were administered through the 
Québec reclassification program; this program is described in Sexton 
(1974); according to Sexton, the reclassification measures may hâve 
some impact on the behaviour of job searchers. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 shows average wage rates asked (minimum) and accepted 
by each group of job searchers, as a percentage of the last wage before 
lay-off. Table 3 is similar, but introduces the duration of unemploy-
TABLE 2 
One-way analysis of variance, contrasts and T-test.- Average asking changes 
(minimum) and accepted wage changes, by job search strategy. 
Groups 
A B C D F(p) Contrasts (p 
Minimum "x -12.145 -11.614 -12.251 -8.129 3.3053 A-D (.002) 
wage s 15.362 16.575 14.803 18.619 (.0197) B-D (.050) 
demands n 593 152 72 180 C-D (.067) 
Accepted x" -5.338 -8.459 -6.885 0.3698 None 
wages s 26.603 20.271 27.758 (.6911) signif. 
n 152 72 180 
t -3 .27 -1 .88 -0 .71 
P .001 .064 
/ contrasts significant at the 5% level are 
.481 
reported. Note: Onl\ 
4
 This is not entirely consistent with Holt's model. Moreover, due account 
must be taken of Rottenberg's remarks on the value of responses to questions on job 
choice (Rottenberg, 1956). 
5
 Note that lay-offs were spread evenly over the entire fifteen-month period. 
Average durations of lay-off are shown in table 1. Only 16 individuals had been laid 
off less than 30 days. The analysis reported hère was repeated, excluding those 16, 
and yielded similar results. 
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ment6 into the analysis. The method used is one-way analysis of 
variance and multiple contrasts among the group means.7 T-tests are 
used when two sample means only are compared.8 
Table 2 shows that, with respect to minimum asking wages, 
«snatchers» (Groups B and C) and continuously unemployed job 
seekers (Group A) appear to constitute one homogeneous grouping, 
while «stickers» (Group B) stand out as significantly différent from 
ail other groups. On the other hand, when accepted wages are consider-
ed, «snatchers» and «stickers» show no significant différence. More-
over, accepted wages are significantly différent from asking wages for 
«snatchers», but not for «stickers». This may be interpreted as reflect-
ing a relative insensitivity of the minimum asking wage to unemploy-
ment, except when the job seeker does accept what he considers to be 
a permanent job. This would imply that the job search strategy, or 
the reemployment path chosen, might play a major rôle in the déter-
mination of the wage behaviour of job searchers. 
Table 3 lends some support to this déduction. Whether unem-
ployment lasted less or more than one month had no significant effect 
on the minimum asking wages for ail groups. In terms of accepted 
wages, however, «stickers» appear to hâve performed much better if 
they accepted a job in the first month of unemployment, while «snatch-
ers» maintained approximately the same level of performance. 
DISCUSSION 
It is important to bear in mind that the sample of job searchers 
under discussion was drawn from one firm in one urban labor market. 
However, inferences drawn from thèse results provide significant 
indications which may be useful in the orientation of further research. 
For the sample of job searchers under study, it has been found 
that job search strategy seems to be a much more important variable 
than unemployment duration in the détermination of wage behaviour. It 
would appear, then, that changes in the level of wage aspirations, if 
they occur, are insignificant throughout the period of unemployment. 
An adjustment in the level of aspirations would occur, for obvious 
reasons, only when the job searcher is willing to accept a job which 
6
 The two subclasses of unemployment duration were established after exten-
sive preliminary analysis. When data for ail groups were pooled, it was found that, in 
terms of wage behaviour, a clear out-off point appeared around thirty days of unem-
ployment. Nevertheless, in order to increase the size of Groups Ci and Di the analysis 
was repeated, using other subclasses of unemployment duration; the results obtained 
were not significantly différent from those reported hère. Contrasts Bi — B2 and Ci — 
C2 were checked more than once and are not significant. even at the 10% level. 
7
 The analysis of variance technique is standard and is explained in Guenther 
(1974). 
8
 The program used was SPSS, CDC version 5.8. 
TABLE 3 
One-way analysis of variance and contrasts.-
Average asking wage changes (minimum) and accepted wage changes, by job 
search strategy and duration of unemployment. 
Unemployment One-mon th More than 1 "(p) Contrasts (p) 
duration or less one month 
Groups A, B, c, D, A2 B2 c2 D2 
Minimum X -13.587 - 6.429 -7.106 -5.582 - 12.382 -11.790 - 13.280 -9.221 1.988 None 
wage s 10.193 13.155 13.093 19.058 15.473 16.686 15.009 18.396 (.054) signif. 
demands n 16 5 12 54 577 147 60 126 
Accepted X -7.445 -5.776 1.172 -5.267 -8.996 - 10.338 1.670 D1-D2 (.007) 
wage s s 30.171 20.980 25.463 26.587 20.265 28.079 (.141) 
n 5 12 54 147 60 126 
Note: Only contrasts significant at the 5% level are reported. 
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he considers permanent. However, the duration of unemployment 
would then affect the level of accepted wages. In other words, aspi-
rations remain relatively unchanged during job search; however, the 
longer unemployment lasted, the lower accepted wages would be. 
Holt's assumption of an aspiration level declining through the 
period of unemployment would thus appear to be unnecessary, at 
least when aspirations are set at a minimum level. Of course, this 
conclusion probably results from such a définition of wage aspirations, 
and there is no claim hère that one essential élément of Holt's model 
is disproved. However, a job searcher may hâve in mind, at any given 
moment, a number of différent and possibly conflicting levels of aspi-
ration. 9 Our results suggest that the pattern of behaviour may dépend 
significantly on which aspiration level is given a greater weight; this, 
in turn, may be affected by the job search strategy chosen by the 
worker.10 
Indeed, the job search strategy hypothesis does receive some 
support hère. However, this hypothesis should probably be modifled in 
the light of our results. There is no évidence that «stickers» do better 
than «snatchers» do, except during the first month of unemployment. 
On the other hand, there is some évidence that wages accepted by 
both «snatchers» and «stickers» tend to be lower after a month's 
unemployment than what «stickers» hâve accepted earlier. Thus, losses 
incurred by adopting a «snatcher's» strategy immediately after iay-off 
would not be recovered by moving later on to higher-paying jobs. 
In pratical terms, this suggests that a job searcher should adopt a 
«sticker's« strategy during the first few weeks of unemployment; if 
this fails, he should then resort to a «snatcher's» strategy and accept 
temporary jobs in order to lower the cost of search and minimize his 
losses. 
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A NOTE ON INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN 
BRITISH COLUMBIA'S 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Joseph B. ROSE 
Since the publication of the Goldenberg inquiry into construction 
labour relations in Ontario (1962), the industrial relations system in 
construction has corne under increasing scrutiny. l Studies by Golden-
berg and Crispo2, Woods3 and Rose4 hâve explored such topics as 
the structure, performance and issues of collective bargaining, the 
certification process, and the accréditation of contractor associations. 
J. B. Rose, Assistant Professor, School of Administration, University of New 
Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B. 
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